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ABSTRACT
This article examines the problem of understanding historical responsibility 
in the context of historical perspective. The author questions what makes 
responsibility historical, in which ways responsibility can be written into a 
chronology and how the meaning of responsibility should be understood. 
Based on Agamben’s reconsideration of Pilate’s trial of Jesus, an analysis of 
the origins of contemporary dualism in understanding the responsibility of the 
metaphysical perspective of an unchanging semantic value and the variability 
of the requirements of contingent situations for the execution of an act is 
carried out. In addition, the article examines the relationship of responsibility 
for the past (primarily constituted through the prism of guilt and memory) and 
responsibility for the future as viewed in an instrumentalist vein and in the 
context of messianism. Historical responsibility can be conceptualised on the 
basis of an ontological approach to understanding responsibility (Heidegger, 
Levinas, Derrida, Nancy), according to which the connections of responsibility 
are not limited to imputations of obligations to recognise guilt, but rely on the 
fundamental basis of human activity. With this method of consideration, the 
historicity of responsibility does not lie in the localisation of certain events on 
time intervals, but rather is seen as the unfolding of the meaning of human 
deeds, thanks to which people, actions, intentions and ideas are organised 
into a single historical perspective. Historical relationships of responsibility 
are not limited by the time, space or social status of people, but are tied by 
the finitude of the existence of those whom they bind.   
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Introduction
Despite its relevance to political discourse, the topic of historical responsibility is not 
widely covered in contemporary Russian research. As such, it is rarely seen as a topic 
in its own right, but is instead raised in relation to issues of historical memory or national 
consciousness. Among recent interesting initiatives in this area, mention should be 
made of the proposal of the editorial board of the journal Historical Expertise “Global 
Memory: A Culture of Historical Responsibility in the 21st Century” (“Global Memory”, 
2016, p. 10). The authors of the programme refer, in particular, to a possible direction 
for research in terms of an “investigation of the culture of historical responsibility, 
increasingly expressed in public apologies by political and public figures for crimes of 
the past” (“Global Memory”, 2016, p. 10) and suggest the possibility of “the adoption of 
the concept of historical responsibility in the political culture of the 21st century” (“Global 
Memory”, 2016, p. 10). 
 When getting acquainted with the programme, the question arises as to whether 
such an understanding of historical responsibility is sufficient. After all, in the text 
presented, it is almost impossible to ascertain who should apologise to whom and for 
what; likewise, whether other gestures and practices are possible within the framework 
of a culture of historical responsibility and where is the limit after which sincere regrets 
and willingness to cooperate turn into mere politeness and cynical calculation? Of 
course, in this case, the main emphasis is placed on the concept of global memory, 
compared to which historical responsibility is something of an auxiliary practice: the 
discussion primarily concerns a project that points out vectors for further research. 
However, it should be noted that K. A. Pahluk (2016) asks questions similar to those 
expressed herein, but already applied to the concept of global memory. 
 Despite the text failing to present a detailed description of the concept of 
historical responsibility, it becomes clear that the discussion concerns itself with some 
practices of public acknowledgement of historical guilt and the ability and willingness 
to participate in discussion and a rethinking of the past. Since the second half of the 
twentieth century, such practices have increasingly become a “mandatory attribute” of 
speeches by politicians, heads of corporations or other large organisations that have 
a rich, but not always untarnished history. In the research literature, these practices 
have been correspondingly referred to as institutional responsibility (Green, 2002), 
corporate social responsibility (Frank, Nezhyba, Heydenreich, 2006) and political 
responsibility (“Thinking Justice after Marion Young”, 2013). Admittedly, these all have 
a broader interpretation and do not revolve exclusively around a concern with formerly 
committed acts. 
 Additionally, problems of interaction with the tragic past enter the research 
interests of many disciplinary areas, each relying on its own conceptual framework 
and accordingly presupposing the realisation of its own goals and a solution to specific 
methodologically and theoretically grounded problems. From this point of view, a 
study can approach these problems e.g. from socio-philosophical, anthropological or 
even psychoanalytic outlooks. However, a whole series of concepts used in such an 
examination have no affiliation to any one discipline: this generates many interpretative 
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discrepancies and rifts and also makes it extremely difficult to describe the root 
phenomena. The concept of historical responsibility can be counted among these.
 The difficulties associated with this concept are enumerated by the following: 
firstly, the problematic division in understanding moral, legal, political and even 
theological aspects of responsibility, of which discussion is unavoidable at the 
same time both as a form of ethical obligation and as a duty (in these sense the 
boundary between responsibility and accountability becomes blurred); secondly, the 
need to explain the nature of the writing of responsibility in the historical context. 
This article sets out to clarify these complexities whose purpose is to consider the 
very possibility of comprehending historical responsibility from the (same) historical 
perspective, which suggests tracing the sometimes-complicated relations between 
history, the temporal direction and the ways of conceptualising responsibility. Since 
such a trajectory of purpose presupposes the solution of multifaceted tasks, the 
structure of this article will be organised as follows: starting from the complexities 
associated with the problematisation of responsibility itself, the two most common 
ways of measuring responsibility will be considered first, avoiding a division into 
disciplinary and functional affiliation. Then, problematising the possibility of writing 
responsibility into the historical context, we consider the sources of the contradiction 
between a consideration of the eternal and unchanging sense of responsibility and 
the temporal, circumstantial context of its adoption; we analyse the possibilities of 
assigning responsibility to a chronological extent. Finally, we will provide a conceptual 
basis for understanding historical responsibility and its consideration in the context of 
understanding the future.
 However, is it necessary to begin our examination with the question of what 
constitutes historical responsibility itself? Due to the multifaceted nature of the issues 
that fall under consideration in this context, it is not a simple matter to find an adequate 
definition. In this article, the following positions will be supported: Historical responsibility 
presents itself as a complex social phenomenon, presupposing the forging of such 
connections about the past, the future, and possibly also with bi-directional relations 
where the realisation of the past in the present, as well as the formulation of the future 
as a projection of the past, are implied. They are acted out both by individuals and 
various communities against a backdrop of feelings of guilt, retribution, repentance or 
recognition of merit, and are represented (mainly) in narrative, commemorative and 
political practices. In the context of such relations, the boundaries between individual 
and collective are often eroded, and legal and moral criteria for assessing unfolding 
events are problematic. Not only does the study of historical responsibility not fit into 
any one thematic or disciplinary dimension (as we have already said), it also assumes 
the free inter-transitivity of various discourses from the position of research.
 As we can see from this definition, we do not limit our understanding of historical 
responsibility solely to practices of repentance and apology, but also include in it 
representations concerning positive responsibility, which involve the topic of merit 
recognition and the commemoration of outstanding events and figures. In addition, 
paying attention to the temporal aspects of responsibility, we propose to examine it 
in the context of both the past and the future (the need for such aspiration, though 
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in terms of understanding global memory and the ethics of altruism, is proposed by 
Sergei Ehrlich (2016). 
Two measures of responsibility
Why is the writing on responsibility in a historical perspective a problem at all? This 
question is by no means absurd in its salience and relevance, despite the fact that it is 
easy to answer when referring to the superficiality of problems of historical politics and 
historical soldiers (Miller, 2016; Finkel, 2011). 
 At the same time, the complexity that is concealed in the very notion of 
responsibility with this perspective of foresight remains unremarked upon. The fact is 
that, with regard to responsibility in the context of history and time, we simultaneously 
oppose (in the act of imputation) and connect (in acts of acceptance and recognition) 
something immutable and eternal – for example, human rights, with the (quasi) 
determination of the deeds and actions committed. For example, S. Ehrlich presents 
a thesis, in agreement with “an ethics of history based on human rights, which in turn 
are derived from the Promethean pity for people and from Christian love for one’s 
neighbour.” (Ehrlich, 2016, p. 21). Considering this statement, it can be assumed that, 
through responsibility, the diversity of relative values, in the case of the researcher’s 
stated position, could be called egotistical, to be governed by good as absolute debt-
love to one’s neighbour and compassion towards all men. Such a position, in turn, 
presupposes the development of a certain system of requirements and prescriptions, 
pre-emptive, in the case of the future, and being maintained “retroactively” in the case 
of the past. 
 However, regarding such a vision of responsibility, it is necessary to make 
two important qualifications. The first one assumes that we are dealing with the 
universalisation and absolutisation of certain values, without relating them to the 
cultural and historical context, both intentional and not (see, for example: Pakhliuk, 
2016, p. 36; Guibernau, 2007). In addition, we should not ignore the consequentialist 
positions that are widespread in environmental ethics, and examine the problem of 
historical responsibility, for example, in the context of climate change (Jamieson, 2013; 
Brennan, Lo, 2016). It should be noted that this line of argument can be not only 
about moral obligation towards the actions of the participants in the situation, but also 
about giving the absolute value status of the event itself, thus accumulating in itself the 
completeness of moral mandates. In the modern Russian context, the Great Patriotic 
War can be regarded as such an event. (In this connection, a body of research has 
been compiled “Victory-70: Reconstruction of the Jubilee” [2015]). 
 The second reservation indicates that these perspectives of responsibility are 
not the only possible ones and that there are approaches – for example, those of 
Heidegger, Levinas or Nancy – in which neither the correlation of the idea of good 
nor the universalisation of value is presupposed. Instead, responsibility receives a 
different, ontological reading, in which it builds upon the initial foundation of basic 
human deeds and actions, tied to neither the eternal absolute and immutable senses, 
or to any prescribed practices.
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 Thus, the very concept of responsibility turns out to be the more complex relative 
to imputation of obligations and recognition of merit, and acquires two dimensions, one 
of which is established and functions within the prescriptive systems (mainly moral and 
legal); the other relates directly to evolution and, therefore, infinitely changing human 
existence. This division leads to the fact that every discussion about responsibility, 
like every decision to be made, is built on the interoperability of these two dimensions, 
which sometimes even contradict each other. In this case, we have not only the factor 
of difference between moral and legal values, but also the impossibility of examining 
certain events and deeds adequately. At the same time, such “incommensurable” 
events become authentically historical for us, as they serve both as an expression 
and a point of problematisation of historical responsibility. In our opinion, through the 
source and signification of a similar understanding, a characteristic of the Western way 
of thinking became the trial of Jesus. 
Responsibility: between historical and eternal
In his modest work “Pilate and Jesus,” Giorgio Agamben quoting Carl Schmitt remarks 
that “Christianity is a historical religion, that the ‘mysteries’ of which it speaks are also 
and above all historical facts, is taken for granted. If it is true that the incarnation of 
Christ is a ‘historical event of infinite, non-appropriable, non-occupiable singularity’, 
the trial of Jesus is therefore one of the key moments of human history, in which 
eternity has crossed into history as a decisive point. All the more urgent, than, is the 
task of understanding, how and why, this crossing between the temporal and the 
eternal and between the divine and the human assumed precisely the form of krisis, 
that is, of the juridical trial” (Agamben, 2015, p. 2). This specific position is interesting 
for many reasons, but mainly because it highlights the borderline or crisis event, as 
the researcher calls it, which, in reality, involves too many fields of social knowledge 
concepts customary for us and widely used in ethics – above all, responsibility, 
guilt, history and repentance. Considering the scene of the trial of Jesus, Agamben 
investigates the origins of the problem present in the Western way of thinking of the 
nature of inter-transitivity in history and responsibility, within the fullness and complexity 
meant by the rationale, including the contradictions between universalist ethics and 
case law.
 Indeed, irrespective of what views – religious or atheistic – one adheres to, the 
irresolvable inter-transitivities between the historical and the eternal, asserted by the 
researcher, leave an imprint on many customary phenomena and practices. With 
such an examination of political differences in connection with history, questions of 
the ethical and legal dimensions of certain events, one’s own methods of judging 
the past or looking at future prospects, determinism and indeterminism, one way or 
another accompany any assessment – condemnation and sentencing – become an 
approximate replica of Pilate’s court. In other words, concerning extremely important 
events, those whose relevance and significance are perceived as enduring and 
endowed with some higher meaning, we find ourselves in a paradoxical situation: 
how to make a decision about these higher and enduring values using no other tools 
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than those represented in the contemporary arsenal of legal and moral criteria. In 
connection with this, questions of who should be held accountable for what and to 
whom, acquire a new and sometimes paradoxical tone. This situation, for example, 
is responsible for such painful debates about “ancestral territories”, the emergence 
of national states, political values and the consequences of geographical discoveries, 
say, in the context of postcolonial research, being made circular and insoluble.
 For this very reason, the conversation about historical responsibility turns to 
considering the book Pilate and Jesus. It is precisely responsibility, despite the fact 
that this word itself is almost not used by Agamben, that is the only and absolute 
(absolutely insoluble) content of the unfolding confrontation between the temporal and 
the eternal, the divine and the earthly. It is very likely that such a view may give the 
impression of an overly complicated interpretation, though in reality only two “kinds” 
of obligations for making decisions are being dealt with – secular ones, to which legal 
criteria are applied, and spiritual ones, viewed from the standpoint of religious ethics. 
In that case, should these criteria be separated from each other and considered 
separately?
 This is the primary difficulty of our consideration. At first glance, it seems 
that in both cases it is necessary to follow the traditional logic of reasoning that 
recognises whosoever is guilty only when a number of conditions are met, and only 
in connection with the violation of certain regulations or prohibitions alleged by one 
system or the other (moral, legal, etc.). Of course, from this position, the question of 
whether it is possible to implicate Pilate in the death of Jesus can be approached. 
Then one of the possible considerations will be to try to resolve the situation within 
the parameters of the modern legal discourse of guilt, thus avoiding any reference 
to the metaphysical context of the problem. But the thesis put forward by Agamben 
(Agamben, 2015; Dusenbury, 2017) in essence is that Pilate does not make a 
final judgement on execution (does not pass sentence), and thus the question of 
legitimising the execution of Jesus from the point of view of the law remains open 
and the whole situation is insoluble. Moreover, religious methods of determining guilt 
are also untenable, it seems to the researcher that the ontological foundations of the 
unfolding evangelical drama are deteriorating: “If Pilate, however, has not handed 
down a legitimate judgement, the encounter between the vicar of Caesar and Jesus, 
between the human law and the divine, between the earthly and celestial cities, loses 
its raison d’être and becomes an enigma. At the same time, every possibility of a 
Christian political theology or of the theological justification of profane power turns 
out to fail” (Agamben, 2015, p. 57). In Agamben’s narrative, Pilate is portrayed as 
a man tormented both by his own inability to make a decision and the impossibility 
of ridding himself of the pressure of circumstances and the demands of the social 
context to which the trial must conform, and turns out to be “not entirely” responsible 
if the traditional logic of reasoning is followed. 
 However, in his criticism of Agamben’s research, David Lloyd Dusenbury 
(2017) argues that Pilate nevertheless passed the verdict; moreover – “This is the 
tragic interest of Pilate’s psychology in the canonical gospels: he declares Jesus to 
be innocent, but he orders the crucifixion. In terms of Aristotle’s Poetics, Pilate kills 
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Jesus like Medea kills her children: consciously” (p. 12) (italics are the author’s – D.T.). 
It would seem that the problem is simply resolved, because the main criterion that 
makes a person responsible – consciousness – is observed. However, instead, the 
researcher pays attention to another dilemma, interpreting from early Christian texts: 
“The Roman prefect is neither crazed nor deceived. [That is, regarding an ability to 
bear responsibility – D.T.] And, because of this, the question – however misdirected – 
can be raised: is Pilate’s decision to crucify the Son of God an act of consummate 
impiety (since Jesus is not only innocent, but ‘the light of the world’)a, or a sign of 
reluctant piety (since Jesus, nevertheless, ‘must be lifted up’ for the salvation of the 
world)b?” (In this passage, the author refers to the Gospel of John. When quoting, 
these references were designated by us as a and b. a: John 8:12, cf. 12: 34-36, 46. And 
for “Son of God”: John 19: 7; b: John 3: 14-15). 
 When put in this way, the issue of responsibility is radically changed, since it is 
not the guilt itself that is at the centre, but rather the “quality” of this guilt. Moreover 
(Agamben also draws attention to this), the messianic character of the decision is 
highlighted. Then the actions of Pilate are already simultaneously both intentional 
and predestined, although, this circumstance no longer allows responsibility to be 
discussed solely in the secular context and with the traditional logic of reasoning. In 
other words, using the “messianic perspective” interweaves the secular chronology of 
events into a timeless metaphysical context.
 Indeed, therein lies the paradox insists on by Agamben: when we consider Pilate’s 
decision, there is not and can be no responsibility arising without a mutual interweaving 
and amalgamation of the temporal and eternal. Consequently, it may be noted that it 
is not the question of whether or not the procurator of Judea was able to render a 
judgement that is being dealt with, but rather whether or not we ourselves are able to 
decide on what happened by using this criteria and means. “The hermeneutical canon 
that we will maintain is, rather, that only as historical character does Pilate carry out his 
theological function and, vice versa, that he is a historical character only insofar as he 
carries out his theological function. Historical character [personaggio] and theological 
persona, juridical trial and eschatological crisis coincide without remainder and only 
in this coincidence, only in their ‘falling together’, do they find their truth” (Agamben, 
2015, p. 35).
 This tension between the historical as temporal and worldly, and historical as eternal, 
which causes their mutual infiltration of each other, has had a decisive impact on the 
formation of our modern (Western-style) notion of responsibility, in all its ambiguity and 
multidimensionality. If Agamben supposes that Pilate’s legal decision was necessary 
for a kind of theological legitimisation, then in our ordinary life we are dealing more with 
the opposite statement: in order for some legal or moral decision to acquire meaning, 
it must acquire a “metaphysical” legitimisation within the event. The point, therefore, 
is not about separating the wheat from the chaff – separating responsibility into faults: 
moral, legal and political, but about the possibility or impossibility of writing the very 
principle of responsibility with the inherent articulations of truth and justice in the 
earth’s historical perspective. Such a statement of the question itself is problematic – 
indeed, what exactly is meant by it?
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Responsibility and chronological expanse
The simplest method for understanding history, to which the Agamben interpretation 
of the trial of Jesus seems to refer, is to present it as a way of isolating relations within 
an era or event. In other words, a chronology is needed into which some situation are 
slotted, or vice versa, a chronology is created as a consequence of the situation – 
different interpretations are possible here. The familiar division of the time of the entire 
world history into the periods “before the birth of Christ” and “after” is the clearest 
example of this understanding. But how should historical responsibility be presented? 
In our opinion, there are two different approaches.
 The first will consist in trying to describe the historicity of responsibility, i.e., to 
construct history of responsibility itself. It could be described as the most traditionally 
academically. Then we will proceed from the need to write responsibility in the 
chronology already existing, based on the fact that some ideas and some practices – 
imputations, recognition, pride, repentance, commemoration or oblivion – will be 
examined as establishing and transforming in time and space, through eras and cultures. 
For example, Alexei Miller, in his article “The politics of memory in post-communist 
Europe and its impact on the European culture of memory” (Miller, 2016) presents the 
causes, formation and development of two cultures and memory politics at the end of 
the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries each establishing its own understanding 
of responsibility. Thus, the researcher notes that for Western European countries 
“the consensus on the Holocaust in itself was of great importance. He excluded the 
construction of national historical narratives in this part of Europe in which the primary 
loser would be the titular nation. It was impossible to demand preference, referring 
to previous suffering. At the centre was the question of personal responsibility – 
and the measures that should be taken to prevent the recurrence of crimes such as 
the Holocaust ”(Miller, 2016, p. 112). At the same time, Eastern European countries 
have a completely different understanding of the role of their citizens in the history 
of the twentieth century and instead of a consensus on common responsibility, their 
understanding is characterised as “export of guilt” (Miller, 2016, p. 116).
 Therefore, in setting the corresponding task, the transformations of responsibility 
in history will be possible to be described and analysed for trends and divergences from 
them, in order to emphasise, depending on the chosen approach, some generalising 
teleological line or the fundamentally random nature of occurring developments, based 
on for example the methodology of Michel Foucault. Certainly, in this case there is 
always a choice: either the creation of an individual history of responsibility will be 
attempted, or – much more difficult – the tracing of a genealogy of responsibility. 
An obstacle in committing to this trajectory arises after turning to various concepts, 
historical and philosophical endeavours – or to the archives of quotes and practices: 
the problem with this practice is that it will scatter the logic of the initially chosen 
trajectory. In other words, this approach shows how responsibility is constituted in the 
past – allowing us to identify the various premises for such a constitution, for example, 
political or economic – but does not say anything about how the chronology itself is 
constituted through the prism of responsibility. 
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 In this case, we do not mean the problem of giving meaning to the events 
inscribed in the chronology, which is precisely what this approach aims at solving. 
As a result, there is always a danger that, starting from some of the most popular 
ways of understanding the human relation organisation we call responsibility, we 
will reconstruct the dynamics of this organisation in the past, giving it some arbitrary 
duration in time and ascribing it meanings common to us in our modern context. In like 
manner, the history of all things and phenomena can be created. However, in such a 
history, the crises of the temporal and eternal, deliberate and predestined, legitimate 
and illegitimate as such are not understood or problematised.
 The second way is to try to define some perspective, from which responsibility 
with an unchanging value throughout time can be discussed, in the same way that 
some self-same idea or practice places a limit on the extent of the self-evidence 
of its own value, making any additional attempt towards a “dictionary” definition 
pointless. So, when it is said that it is impossible to overestimate the significance of the 
discovery by Fleming of the discovery of penicillin or the discovery of America made 
by Columbus, it seems to us that it is about the same understanding of responsibility. 
This understanding allows transitions between the comprehension of responsibility, 
as relating to private life and the responsibility extended to “wider” communities, to be 
made – for example, citizens of one state or persons united by a common history. 
 Indicative in this respect is the text of Vladimir Yakovlev entitled “My grandfather – 
Chekist and murderer”, in which the author shares his experience of his own moral 
trauma in connection with the discoveries of his family history and encourages readers 
to responsibly rethink the past, advocating a broadening of all residents’ understanding 
within the country: “We often think that the best way to protect ourselves from the 
past is not to disturb it, not to dig into the family history, not to dig into the horrors that 
have happened to our relatives. It seems to us that it is better not to know. In fact, 
it is worse. Much worse. What we do not know continues to influence us, through 
childhood memories, through relationships with parents. Simply, without knowing, 
we do not recognise this influence and are thus powerless to resist it.” (Yakovlev). 
It should be noted that this publication caused two radically different types of reader 
reaction: a general agreement with the call for responsible rethinking of the past, and 
radical denial, as well as scepticism about the authenticity of the narrative. In fact, such 
reactions are both indicative and predictable, since they reflect the poignancy and 
sensitivity associated with the task of rethinking the history of the twentieth century in 
contemporary Russian society. 
 For that very reason, any determination of the meaning, explanation or 
interpretation of responsibility becomes meaningless: this will only complicate the 
already developed system of relations, overload it with “superfluous” meanings and 
confuse both those who make the decision and those who must be held accountable. 
Let us recall the classic example already given of Eichmann’s recognition of moral 
guilt, but denial of criminal guilt (Arendt, 2006). Pilate’s court and all subsequent 
courts and decisions, becoming milestones in the continuous chronology of mankind’s 
responsibility, no matter whether it is about protecting the environment or about past 
episodes of injustice, violence or exploitation, address self-evidence, and at the same 
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time always need to be explained or correlated with the place in time. Derrida saw 
this problem (with regard to the politicisation of forgiveness), in the following way: 
“It is between these two poles, irreconcilable but indissociable, that decisions and 
responsibilities are to be taken” (Derrida, 2005, p. 45). 
 When referring to this text, in the context of our consideration, it is necessary to 
pay attention to the following. Listing the various politicised practices of recognising the 
guilt and turmoil of the traumatic past and substituting forgiveness (that is, practices 
that most often fall under the definition of historical responsibility), the researcher uses 
the notion of historical ecology (Derrida, 2005, p. 45). This concept can be useful 
for understanding historical responsibility because it enables the limitations of the 
two approaches described above to be overcome. Therefore, if we proceed from the 
most general definition of ecology as the interconnection of elements with each other 
and the environment that organises these interrelationships, and depends itself on 
their organisation (see, for example, Sarkar, 2016), so with such an interpretation 
responsibility becomes the very method of organising the interrelationships of 
various elements of history (history as an environment): meanings, people, dates, 
events, intentions, goals, motives and results, both in the past and in the future. This 
very way of organising interrelationships is both self-evident and indefinable; the 
discussion, however, is not about an unchanging meaning, which could also be called 
substantivisation, at the basis of responsibility, and it is not being attempted here to 
write some events into the available chronology to the detriment of the rest that do not 
fit into a predetermined framework. It is noted that the understanding proposed here 
turns out to be close to the notion of the “signature” proposed by Agamben (2009). 
Historical responsibility as the unfolding of meaning
But what is signified by the understanding of historical responsibility as an organisation 
of event interconnections, people and phenomena? On what principles can this 
interconnectedness be established? In order to answer this question, we need to turn 
to an ontological approach to understanding responsibility. In general, this approach 
assumes that resorting to responsibility not only does not imply the existence of any 
substantivist understanding, but is born every time from a single, concrete act of 
human interaction, becoming the very way of realising these interactions (as was noted 
above, referring to the concept of historical Ecology). (On ontological approaches in 
the understanding of responsibility, see: Raffoul, 2010). From this point of view, it must 
be said that responsibility does not arise after the fact, but becomes inherent in the 
event itself. With this understanding, historical responsibility is not bound by the need 
to be fully isolated in the existing chronology or completely governed by any external 
prescriptions and restrictions, say, in space and time. For example, in this context, 
responsibility could be said to begin at some defined moment in time, and end after 
the passing of a certain time period, in connection with, for instance, the expiration of a 
statute of limitations, or in connection with the advent of punishment or in finding those 
answerable in a different situation of political or legal status (as we can see in the case 
of criminal liability). 
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 The investigation conducted by Denis Karagodin of the circumstances surrounding 
the shooting of his great-grandfather, Stepan Ivanovich Karagodin serves as an 
illustrative example of this position. The researcher established the name and title of 
all persons involved in this shooting, beginning with those who directly committed the 
act and those who supported it and ending with the city authorities who signed the 
death warrant. It should be noted that the progress and results of the investigation 
were widely covered by Internet publications, and its author started an open Internet 
page for posting the latest news and updates in the investigation (http://blog.
stepanivanovichkaragodin.org/). The interest generated by this story can be explained 
for several reasons: firstly, clarification of the tragic fate of people’s ancestors and the 
identification of specific culprits has never become a widespread Russian practice; 
Secondly, in this case it is completely impossible to discuss criminal responsibility in 
full (following the expiry of the statute of limitation and due to a lack of living culprits). 
However, the very relations of responsibility themselves do not disappear with time, 
thus marking events and people included therein.
 Of course, in this case it is impossible not to analyse the question of whether 
such responsibility extends likewise to descendants. Since this topic deserves a 
separate study, it will not be examined in detail here; it is noted that the discussion 
in this case cannot be about the responsibility of descendants for the past actions of 
their ancestors, but instead must concern the responsibility for comprehending and 
representing the events of the past. It is worth noting that in an interview with channel 
AT2, on the question of whether he will acquaint the descendants of the accused with 
the results of the investigation, Denis Karagodin responded as follows: “Descendants 
(if any) have no obligation towards me and do not owe me anything; the same as I owe 
them nothing. I do not track them in principle; their appearance in the “study” is always 
a kind of surplus to requirement – /.../ they are like an echo of an investigative thread – 
nothing more. /..../ disturbing them is unacceptable – they are not guilty of anything. 
This is essentially my position” (“To call the names of executioners”, 2016). 
 On November 20, 2016 Denis Karagodin received a letter (“Civil Accord”) from 
the “granddaughter of Nikolai Ivanovich Zyryanov – the executioner of the Tomsk 
City Department of the NKVD.” Expressing feelings of regret and shame over newly 
discovered facts in her family history, the author of the letter notes: “So now it comes 
out that in one family there are both victims and executioners ...It’s very bitter to realise 
this, it’s very painful... But I will never disown my family history, whatever it may be. 
Knowing that neither I, nor all the relatives whom I know, remember and love had 
anything to do with these atrocities that occurred in those years will be a solace to me” 
(“Civil Accord”, 2016). In the responding letter, Denis Karagodin suggests extending 
a hand of reconciliation and “nullifying the whole situation” by not distributing the 
tragedy and the blame to the descendants (“Civil Accord”, 2016). The new situation of 
reconciliation must now be built upon the knowledge of past events that have occurred 
and the principal agreement on their value. 
 But, in this case, the very situation under discussion about historical 
responsibility changes, implying that we will consider history itself as responsibility. 
In this understanding, we again will conceptually proceed from an ontological way 
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of understanding responsibility. Then, with a similar perspective of examination, the 
main task of the research becomes not only the analysis of objective facts, dates, 
conditions, prescriptions and norms, but also the establishment of the ethical nature 
of current events.  This evaluation is a paradox in that the timelessness of the idea of 
responsibility and the inscrutability of its practices into the existing Earth chronology 
are deprived of any external criteria for measurement, imputation and evaluation. As 
such, historical responsibility becomes an insoluble problem, determined only by the 
connecting objects themselves, primarily people and events.
 In the opinion of the researchers, the most appropriate concept of responsibility 
for this understanding is the concept of “responsibility for existence” J.-L. Nancy (1999). 
Researcher denied the understanding of the responsibility as some prescription and 
arguing that “We exist as this responsibility; that is, in Heidegger’s words we ek-sist, 
we are exposed to one another to the world – the world which is nothing but this 
very exposure. Existence is responsibility for existence” (p. 8). Based on the views 
of the researcher, it can be said that the very constituting of historicity is no longer 
an external supplement to responsibility like a predicate, as, for example, a line of 
chronology or a successively unfolding scientific theory, but becomes the very method 
of its (responsibility) becoming. At the same time, this becoming is what Nancy himself 
calls the responsibility of sense, where the sense is “the commitment the several 
between each other” (Nancy, 1999, p. 8). The researcher notes the fundamental 
infinitude and untransmissibility of a sense connoting something that has been formed, 
is already taking place or which possesses substantial completeness. In contrast, 
Nancy refers to the fact that sense is always expressed through the other, and that 
this, in turn, depends on the readiness of the person transmitting the thought to always 
be accountable for it (Nancy, 1999, p. 7; p. 9).
 The becoming of sense is in fact, the way in which historical responsibility is 
phenomenalised in various social practices. The problem of the context of the future, 
which has hardly been touched upon in this discussion, is indicative of a greater 
attachment not to predicting the consequences, but towards the meanings that may 
arise in connection with deeds to be realised in concrete actions or events. True, in 
this case, we need to pay attention to the distinction between the concept of historical 
responsibility as the establishment of meaning and messianism, where the latter 
again refers us to the substantivist notion and the external justifications for history and 
chronology.
Historical responsibility as an aspiration for the future
The problem of historical responsibility as an aspiration for the future is developed to 
a lesser degree. Risking the use of the phrase, the imagination of the future, always 
seems less painful as a rule; therefore, the projection thereof produces a somewhat 
smaller emotional reaction. We can talk about such methods of presenting responsibility 
in two ways: the global, which most often involves understanding the responsibility of 
all mankind (which has already been touched upon in relation to environmental ethics 
and climate studies), and the local, which tends to be associated more with the notion 
of messianism. On the notion of messianism, we should examine in a little more detail. 
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What is messianism? In connection with this discussion, Peter J. S. Duncan offers the 
most appropriate definition of messianism: “The proposition or belief that a given group 
is in some way chosen for a purpose. Closely linked to this is the view that the great 
suffering endured by the group will lead somehow to the redemption to the group itself 
and possibly of all humanity” (Duncan, 2000, p. 1). 
 Thus, conversation in the context of historical responsibility can only go so far where 
obligations are concerned that are accepted by any community for the achievement or 
establishment of some desired state, say, economic, political, religious or legal, both 
within itself and other communities. Ideas in the secular variations of messianism, can 
feature liberal worldviews of permanent revolution, ethnic unification, the construction 
of an open market, etc. In short, there are many versions, each of which presupposes 
the establishment of some uniform order, or the formation of social unity, initially based 
on ontological premises, for example: lineage, the past, or even an idea broadcast 
in scientific or political theories. At the same time, the task of establishing this order 
demands the exertion of efforts from a single, “elected” figurehead. (See, for example, 
Duncan, 2000; Merkel, 2008). For the formation and legitimisation of such concepts, it 
is necessary to reference historical grounds which may be derived from the declaration 
of past inherent merits, recognition of their significance (achievements, chosenness, 
righteousness), greatness and radical difference from other communities, which, 
therefore, cannot derive such self-positioning. Note that this form of messianism 
is associated not so much with the figure of the Messiah as with the Mission. The 
community that has laid such obligations upon itself ascribes characteristics of the 
Messiah to itself.
 But messianism can take a different form, resulting from the recognition of 
one’s own (global, universal) guilt, distributable to all humanity – if the discussion, 
for example, is about ecological ethics, or the need to preserve the memory of 
crimes against humanity. In the context of historical responsibility, this approach is 
manifested not only in religious, but also in purely secular interpretations. The opposite 
way of interpretation of messianism in this register is becoming obligatory in some 
communities: ethnic, religious or gender group, etc. where members of different 
communities represent their tragedy as something unique (Finkel, 2011).
 But when it comes to the future, it should be borne in mind that the past, in the 
context of the event interpretation, can be perceived as an independently operating 
player, and in its metaphorical form, plunges one into a peculiar eschatology of 
responsibility, which in an instrumentalised way solidifies into real actions or processes. 
In this way, for example, we can talk about archives. For example, Randall C. Jimerson 
(2007) says: “In addition to protecting the rights and interests of all citizens, archives 
preserve vital aspects of cultural heritage. These dual responsibilities give archivists 
significant power, not only over questions of recordkeeping in today’s society but for 
future generations. Such power carries an obligation to employ it for positive purposes, 
as archivists search for a role to play for the benefit of all people in society” (p. 254). 
However, if above we talked about the link to the past and the events that have already 
occurred to date, then, with regard to the future, such a linkage disappears. In this 
regard historical responsibility is viewed as a retroactive act imputing or acknowledging 
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the imminent pronouncement of guilt; that is, after the execution of certain planned 
acts as a means to an ends had been achieved. 
Conclusion
Thus, in this article, we turned to the solution of a rather difficult task – to study 
how historical responsibility is conceptualised in the historical perspective. The very 
formulation of such a task, as well as the body of problems, issues and contradictions 
that had to be tackled during our consideration, showed the fundamental non-
localisability of the problem of historical responsibility in some separate disciplinary 
and discursive boundaries, as well as its fundamental irreducibility to a limited set 
of practices. This means that we are dealing with a way of organising some people, 
events and phenomena into a single semantic field, the parameters of which are 
simultaneously mobile. Moreover, now we can say that the writing of responsibility in 
the historical perspective does not mean how it should be expected, nor the fulfilment 
of an act of methodological reduction, or the fixing of certain events as points on the 
time scale. On the contrary, historical responsibility is nothing other than a meaningful 
unfolding and becoming of this very historical perspective, which covers looking back 
or seeking to look ahead, beyond the horizon of events, we conceive and cast our 
obligations into eternity. 
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